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Take the Training Wheels Off the
League: Major League Soccer's
Dysfunctional Relationship with the
International Soccer Transfer System
ABSTRACT

Currently in its eleventh season, Major League Soccer (MLS) is
struggling to establish its identity and niche in the internationalsoccer
community.
In particular, issues of player control and transfer
regulations continue to distinguish and alienate the league from the
elite soccer associations of Europe, as well as the overall global soccer
community. Since Fraser v. Major League Soccer, the league has been
defined as a single entity and, thus, is free to wield substantialcontrol
over player contracting and placement, while avoiding charges of
monopolistic behavior. MLS has taken advantage of this freedom
when executing internationaltransfers of MLS players. However, these
mechanisms of player control were explicitly outlawed in Europe in the
landmark European Court of Justice decision in Union Royale Belge
des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n v. Bosman.
The Bosman case forced a complete overhaul of the
internationalplayer transfer system. While the use of transferfees and
other methods of player control were specifically outlawed in Europe,
the Fidration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the
international governing body of association soccer, responded by
establishing a new set of regulations,generally grantingplayers more
rights and freedoms in the international transfer market. However,
MLS's current transfer policies both directly and indirectly conflict
with the international transfer system. League officials defend the
MLS system, arguing that such player controls and restrictions are
necessary to develop the relatively young American soccer league.
However, this justification is countered with evidence that MLS
policies alienate it from the internationalsoccer community, effectively
hindering American players from reaching their full potential and
impeding the progression of MLS and American soccer overall.
Considering this reality, the only practical solution to MLS's current
conflict with the internationalsoccer community is to loosen its control
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over player contracting and transferpolicies. The author argues that
the league has the power to loosen its control over player contracting
and transfer policies without a decline in league talent, level of play,
attraction, or overall development. The author then concludes that
MLS must take the training wheels off the league and reconcile its
policies with those of the internationalsoccer community in order to
take the next step in becoming an elite national soccer association.
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On November 12, 2006, the New England Revolution played for
the Major League Soccer (MLS, or the American league) Cup, the
national championship of the United States' premier soccer league.1
Leading the way for the Revolution were MLS superstars Clint
Dempsey and Shalrie Joseph. Soon after, both players received
million-dollar transfer offers from premier European soccer teams,
colloquially referred to as clubs. 2 Fortunately for the Revolution but
against the ambitions of both players, the structure of MLS allows the
3
league to control and reject international offers for MLS's top talent.
However, as MLS establishes itself on the greater international stage
and continues to cultivate such attractive talent, the future
development and legitimacy of the American league, and American
soccer generally, stands in question due to the tight controls over
player employment.
The international transfer system is the global market for the
trading, selling, and buying of soccer players' employment contracts.
The system entails not only the domestic laws of each country
participating in international soccer, but also the rules and
regulations of both national and international soccer organizations as
well. Traditionally, the international transfer system operated almost
completely without regulation, allowing for the charging of not only
contract fees, but also substantial transfer fees. 4 As players, players'
unions, and legal scholars began to question and protest the legality of
such an unchecked system of player control, the European Court of
Justice took up the issue in 1995 in Union Royale Belge des Socidtds de
Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman.5 In the wake of this landmark
decision, the F~d~ration Internationale de Football Association, the
Union des Associations Europ6ennes de Football, and other
international governing soccer organizations have been forced to
revamp and reformulate player transfer policies in order to better
comply with antitrust law. 6 Once resolute in their implementation of
mandatory transfer and development fees, these organizations now
adhere to antitrust and workers' rights principles, mandating the free
1.
Jason Halpin, Dy-no-mite! Houston Wins MLS Cup, MLSNET.COM, Nov. 12,
2006,
http://www.mlsnet.com/news/mls-eventsnews.jsp?ymd=20061112&content-id=
78552&vkey=mlscup2006&fext=.jsp.
2.
See Frank Dell'Apa, Import or Export League, ESPNSOCCERNET, Sept. 13, 2006,
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id=379297&root=mls25&cc=5901.

3.
See id.; see also infra Part I.B.1, .3 (discussing MLS's organization and transfer
system).
4.
See infra text accompanying notes 19-36.
5.
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921; see also infra text accompanying notes 37-47.
6.
See infra text accompanying notes 117-35.
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movement and free contracting of international players. 7 Essentially,
Bosman forced a tide of reform that loosened the regulations of the
international transfer system, allowing players more control in the
direction of their careers.
Founded in the middle of this reformatory period, MLS, an
infant league when compared to the hundred-year-old European
associations, now finds itself struggling to find its place on the world's
stage. On the one hand, MLS recognizes a need to enforce restrictions
and regulations in order to develop the American league and
American soccer generally. Specifically, MLS has justified the use of
tight control on players and stringent transfer policies to retain its top
talent by claiming the need to retain that talent, thus promoting the
American league's skill level and prominence. 8 At the same time,
however, critics have argued that such restrictions impede MLS's
growth and advancement. 9 In particular, critics maintain that MLS's
near-absolute control over player placement suppresses the
development of American talent and restrains the progress of not only
the American league, but also American soccer in general. 10
Moreover, MLS's increasing signing power and success in drawing
international talent have shed doubt on the justifications for its
restrictive transfer policies.'1
The MLS situation represents the intricate relationship
between American and European antitrust law, as well as the unique
concerns related to sports leagues. Despite the complexities of the
issues involved, one conclusion emerges: under its current structure
and through its present policies and regulations, MLS stands in direct
conflict to the reformed international transfer system. 12 As a result,
the futures of MLS and American soccer, both domestically and within
the global soccer community, depend on the recognition and resolution
of this conflict.
Part I will discuss the MLS and international transfer systems,
as well as the state of current transfer regulations. Part II will
address conflicts stemming from the contradictory rules and principles
of both systems and will discuss the setbacks these conflicts inflict on
MLS and American soccer. Finally, Part III will offer a solution to

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra text accompanying notes 120-25.
See infra text accompanying notes 161-64.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.C.2-.3.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part II.C.1.
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these conflicts, arguing that MLS can, and must, relinquish control
over its players.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The InternationalSoccer Community
1. The Hierarchy of International Soccer: FIFA and National
Associations
To understand soccer's international transfer system, it is
important to understand the hierarchy of soccer's governing
structures. The F6d~ration Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) is soccer's pre-eminent governing organization. 13 Under the
loose authority of FIFA sit continental confederations, including the
Conf6d6ration Africaine de Football (the African Confederation) and
the Union des Associations Europ6ennes de Football (the European
Confederation). 14
Each continental confederation oversees the
national associations of each of its member states.1 5 For instance,
because Belgium is a member state of the European Confederation,
the European Confederation oversees the activities of Belgium's
national soccer league, the Union Royale Belge des Soci~t6s de
16
Football Association (the Belgium National Association).
Originally, each national association was permitted to adopt
the rules and regulations of either its governing continental
confederation or FIFA. However, each national association could also
reject those regulations and establish new ones.1 7 As such, FIFA
originally allowed each national association to establish its own rules
and policies governing the placement and transfer of its players.' 8
Under this system, both the respective continental confederation and
FIFA stood behind and enforced the individually adopted regulations
of each member association.

13.
See James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle Over European Football's Transfer
System, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 667, 676 (2002).
14.
See
FIFA
Confederations,
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/
confederations/index, html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
15.
See Irving, supra note 13, at 676.
16.
Id.
17.
See id.
18.
See id.
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2. Bosman: Reforming the International Out-of-Contract Transfer
System
Given the loose structure of FIFA's original system of
governance over transfer regulations, it was only a matter of time
before a player challenged his national association's policies regarding
his contractual rights and freedom to move as a general employee.
This conflict came in August 1990, when Jean-Marc Bosman
challenged the transfer rules of RC Liege, the Belgian National
Association, and the European transfer system in general. 19
Bosman, a Belgian national, played for RC Liege, a Belgian
first division club, under a two-year contract. 20 Under the Belgian
National Association's transfer rules at the time, a club had to offer a
player a new contract before the expiration of his current contract,
which the player was required either to accept or decline. 21 If the
player declined, he was placed on a list of players available for
transfer. 22 At that point, the player's current club would have no
control over the transfer decision. 23 However, the player's current
club maintained the right to demand a compensation fee for the
training and development of the player, plus a transfer fee, both of
which were to be paid directly to the club by the player's new club. 24 If
no transfer took place, the player's current club was then required to
offer a new contract, identical to the terms of the recently expired
contract, for one season.2 5 If the player refused this offer, then the
26
club maintained the right to suspend the player.
Although the Belgian National Association applied these
particular rules to govern Bosman's transfer, the policies at issue were
adopted from FIFA itself 27
Specifically, the Belgian National
Association adopted the FIFA regulation that a professional player
could not leave his national association while the player was bound by
his contract, "no matter how harsh [the] terms." 28 More importantly,
FIFA regulations mandated that, in order for an international
19.
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci~t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, paras. 34-40.
20.
Id. para. 28.
21.
Id. para. 7.
22.
Id. para. 8.
23.
See id. This means that the player's current club could not control to which
team the player chose to transfer or which transfer offers the player could consider.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. para. 10.
26.
Id.
27.
See id. para. 15.
28.
Id. para. 16.
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transfer to be effectuated, the national association of the current club
had to issue a transfer certificate to the new club's national
association, acknowledging that all financial commitments (including
29
any transfer fees) were settled between the clubs.
On April 21, 1990, RC Liege offered Bosman a new contract,
extending his play for the Belgian club. 30 However, Bosman refused
and was subsequently placed on the club's transfer list.31 Seeking
employment outside of RC Liege, Bosman received attention from US
Dunkerque, a French club. 32 RC Liege and US Dunkerque negotiated
33
for a one-year transfer of Bosman with an option for his full transfer.
After reviewing the contract's details, RC Liege had doubts concerning
the solvency of US Dunkerque and ultimately decided not to request
that the Belgian National Association send a transfer certificate to the
French National Association.3 4 Because RC Liege refused to request
the transfer certificate, Bosman's transfer was never effectuated, and
he remained under RC Liege's authority. 35 As a result, under the
Belgian National Association's rules, Bosman was suspended for the
entire upcoming season. 36 After the prevention of his transfer and the
resulting year-long suspension, Bosman filed suit against RC Liege,
37
the Belgian National Association, and the European Confederation.
The Bosman case fell under the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice (the ECJ).38 Concerning the issue of international
transfers, the ECJ interpreted Bosman's complaint as raising a single
issue: Does article 48 of the Treaty of Rome 39 prohibit a club's
mandatory payment of transfer fees when a player of one member
state of the European Union pursues employment with a club of
another member state after expiration of his current contract? 40 As an

29.

See id.

Id. para. 29.
Id.
See id. para. 30.
See id. para. 31.
Id. para. 33.
35.See id.
Id.
36.
37.
Id. para. 34. In August of 1991, Bosman sought to join the European
Confederation to the proceedings. Id. para. 40.
38.
See id. paras. 59-67.
39.
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 48, Aug. 31, 1992, 1992 O.J.
(C 224) 20 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
40.
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 68. Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome
states:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by
the end of the transitional period at the latest.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

420

VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW [Vol. 10:2:413

initial matter, the defendant-clubs argued that soccer clubs "carry on.
. economic activity only to a negligible extent"; therefore, article 48 of
the Treaty of Rome should not apply. 41 The ECJ rejected this
argument, holding that soccer federations and clubs were subject to
the Treaty of Rome because their actions did constitute economic
activity. 42 The ECJ definitively stated, "[a]rticle 48 of the Treaty [of
Rome] therefore applies to rules laid down by sporting associations...
[that] determine the terms on which professional sportsmen can
43
engage in gainful employment."
The ECJ then analyzed whether the defendants' regulations
actually violated article 48 of the Treaty of Rome. One of the principle
aims of the Treaty of Rome, and the European community in general,
was the freedom of movement of workers throughout the treaty's
member states. 44 Article 48 explicitly provides citizens of member
states the right to leave their country of origin and enter another
member state in order to reside and pursue economic activities in that
state. 4 5 The ECJ determined that the requisite payment of transfer
fees and training and development fees after the expiration of a
player's contract restricted the free movement of players to seek
employment in other member states and, therefore, violated article
48.46 While the Bosman holding was a momentous decision against
the current international transfer system, it addressed only players
who were out-of-contract. 47 The issue of in-contract players provides a
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.

3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed
in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in
implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public
service.
EC Treaty,
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

supra note 39, art. 48.
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 70.
See id. para. 73.
Id. para. 87.
See id. para. 93.
See EC Treaty, supranote 39, art. 48.
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, paras. 99-100, 104.
See id. para. 114.
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separate issue that could eventually wreak legal havoc on the
48
international soccer system.
B. Major League Soccer: The American League's Approach to Transfers
1. MLS's Organization
Founded in 1996, Major League Soccer is the United States'
premier soccer league. 49 The American league maintains thirteen
teams, including one in Toronto that began in 2007. 50 Unlike other
sports leagues, MLS operates as a single, limited liability company;
thus, the league as a whole, including all twelve teams, is recognized
as one legal entity. 5 1 MLS is owned by a group of independent
investors, including a mix of corporations, partnerships, and
individuals, and is governed by a management committee-the Board
of Governors. 52 Unlike other major sports leagues with independent
teams, such as the National Football League (NFL) or the National
Basketball Association (NBA),53 MLS wields "significant centralized
control over both league and individual team operations. MLS owns
all of the teams . . . , as well as all intellectual property rights, tickets,
supplied equipment, and broadcast rights."54 Most importantly, MLS
has near-total control over player employment. 55 Varying again from
traditional sports leagues, MLS has the sole responsibility of
negotiating employment contracts and compensating its players:
"MLS recruits [its] players, negotiates their salaries, pays them from
league funds, . . . determines where each of them will play," 56 and
decides whether players will be permitted to transfer to new teams or
leagues.5 7 Although team operators retain some power over the

48.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-20.
49.
Major League Soccer: General Overview, http://www.mlsnet.comlabout/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2007).

50.

Id.

51.
See id.; see also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir.
2002) (describing MLS as having, "to say the least, a unique structure, even for a sports
league").
52.
Fraser,284 F.3d at 53.
53.
See Pepper Brill, Note, Major League Soccer or Major League Sham? Players

Bring Suit to Bite the Hand that Feeds Them, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 585, 587-88
(1999).

54.
Fraser,284 F.3d at 53.
55.
See infra text accompanying notes 105-11.
56.
Fraser,284 F.3d at 53.
57.
See id. at 53-54. An example of this power is how MLS will "balance talent
among teams" by determining where the league's best players will be placed. Id. at 53.
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composition of their respective teams, MLS retains control over
58
players' entry and exit from of the league.
While MLS wields significant power over the American league
and team operations, it relinquishes some control to individual team
investors. These team investors are members of the larger group of
investors who own the league, but they are more involved in that they
MLS has
also act as operators for their respective teams.5 9
"contract[ed] with these [team] investors to operate nine of the
league's teams," while MLS directly controls the other three.6 0 Team
investors provide exclusive management services and are given
significant leeway in managing their teams. 61 Specifically, they "hire,
at their own expense and discretion," the team's staff, including all
coaches and general managers. 62 Team investors are also "responsible
for local office expenses, local promotional costs for home games, and
one-half the [team's] stadium rent." 6 3 MLS pays the other half of each
64
team's stadium rent.
Additionally, team investors play a role in player selection and
employment. Although team investors cannot bid for or hire players
without the knowledge and approval of the league, "they [can] trade
players with other MLS teams and select players in the league's
draft." 65 However, while team investors may wield some degree of
control over players that are already in the American league, MLS
itself controls all entry into and exit out of the pool of available
players.6 6 As members of the group of owning investors, the team
investors control a majority of the seats on the MLS board, which
provides significant power to the investors since the board is
responsible for "hiring the [MLS] commissioner and approving
national television contracts and marketing decisions, league rules
67
and policies (including team player budgets)."

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. at 53-54.
See id. at 53.
Id.
See id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.

63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.

66.
2007 MLS PLAYER RULES & REGULATIONS § II, http://www.mlsnet.com/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2007)
about/league.jsp?section=regulations&content=overview
[hereinafter 2007 MLS REGULATIONS].
67.
Fraser,284 F.3d at 54.
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2. Fraserv. Major League Soccer: Maintaining the MLS Approach to
Transfers
Challenging the dominating organization of the American
league and the substantial control wielded by MLS, eight players sued
MLS and the team investors under various U.S. antitrust statutes in
February of 1997 in the Federal District of Massachusetts. 68 In Fraser
v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., the players claimed that team
investors were in violation of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act.69 The Sherman Act stipulates that "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 70 The Sherman Act also provides that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 71 The players alleged that
team investors violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by "agreeing not
to compete for player services," 72 and section 2 of the Sherman Act by
monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, the "market for services of
...professional soccer players in the [United States]."73
The players claimed that team investors were in violation of
the Clayton Act, as well.7 4
The Clayton Act prohibits certain
commercial practices that are particularly harmful to consumers,
including: price discrimination that creates monopolies in commerce;
lease or sale of goods on the condition that the purchaser not deal in
the goods and may create a monopoly in any line of commerce; and
acquisition of stock of another corporation which may substantially
lessen competition or create a monopoly. 75 The players contended that
MLS's organization, specifically the consolidation of the assets of the
team investors, "substantially lessened competition and tended to
create a monopoly in violation of Clayton Act section 7 ' '76 However,
the district and appellate courts disagreed.
In response to the

68.
69.
18 (2000).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 54-55.
Id.; see Sherman Act § 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000); Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. §
Sherman Act § 1.
Sherman Act § 2.
Fraser,284 F.3d at 54-55.
Id. at 55.
Id. (citing Clayton Act § 7).
Clayton Act §§ 2-3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 18 (2000).
Fraser,284 F.3d at 55.
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Sherman Act claims, the district court held that MLS legitimately
comprised a single entity and, therefore, could not legally conspire, as
is required to be in violation of the Sherman Act. 77 Consequently, the
court granted summary judgment to MLS as to the Sherman Act
claims. 78 The court also granted summary judgment to MLS as to the
79
Clayton Act claim.
On review, in March 2002, the First Circuit examined the
district court's holding and ducked its decision granting MLS single
entity status.8 0 The court explained that, traditionally, single entity
status was not granted to sports leagues.8 1 However, the district court
followed the rule established in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., which held that "a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary
are not subject to attack under section 1 [of the Sherman Act] for
agreements between them. They are treated for section 1 purposes as
a single economic actor."8' 2 Recognizing this rule, the appellate court
noted that MLS resembles an ,ordinary, singular corporation in that it
"owns substantial assets (teams, player contracts, stadium rights,
intellectual property) critical to the performance of the league" and
distributes a substantial portion of its revenues among its team
investors.8 3 Therefore, the district court abided by Copperweld in
84
affirming MLS as a single entity.
Recognizing that MLS varies from traditional sports leagues,
the First Circuit acknowledged that operators and investors in other
leagues, such as the NFL, do not exist as part of an over-arching
corporate structure as they do in MLS.8 5 On the other hand, however,
the appellate court also found that the conflicting individual interests
of team investors in improving their own team created the potential
This inherent
for competition within the American league.86
of
MLS
operating
the
notion
a
sports
league
challenged
competition of
8
7
As a result, the court distinguished the
as a single economic actor.
case from Copperweld, which dealt with pure subsidiaries of the
77.

See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D.Mass.

2000).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
(1984)).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.
See id. at 141-42.
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002).
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 56 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 56.
See id. at 57.
Id. at 56-57.
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parent corporation, because the team investors of MLS were not "mere
88
servants" of the league.
Acknowledging the arguments on both sides of this single
entity debate, the First Circuit ultimately labeled MLS a "hybrid"
organization: something "between a single company . . . and a
cooperative arrangement between existing competitors."8 9 Given this
unique situation, the appellate court found a lack of precedent;
nevertheless, it recognized two approaches for applying U.S. antitrust
laws to such an organization: either (1) expand the Copperweld rule to
include hybrid organizations, like MLS, or (2) reshape section 1 of the
Sherman Act to include hybrids. 90
In the end, the First Circuit ducked the question of the
American league's single entity status, choosing instead to resolve
each count on the merits. 9 1 As to the first claim, that MLS violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court held that the plaintiffs did not
establish a violation because they failed to prove the requisite market
to ground the claim. 92 Therefore, regardless of MLS's single entity
status, the claim failed. 93
The appellate court also dismissed the claim alleging MLS's
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 94 To prove monopolization
or an attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2, a plaintiff must
prove that the contested market was actually subject to monopoly
power. 9 5 The First Circuit affirmed the district court's definition of
monopoly power as "the power to pay lower than competitive wages for
the services being acquired without having the sellers of those
services-the players-turn to another league or team for
While the district court broadly considered
employment." 96
opportunities available in foreign leagues around the world, the
plaintiffs objected, arguing that the court should only consider those
leagues that were "sufficiently attractive and practically available to a
large enough number of MLS players." 97 Despite this argument, the
88.

Id. at 57-59.

Id. at 58.
89.
90.
See id.
91.
Id. at 59.
See id. at 60-61. Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that the relevant market in
92.
this case was that of Division I soccer players in the United States. See id. at 55. However,
the plaintiffs never produced evidence that another arrangement or less-restrictive league
structure would increase player salaries or enhance competition in MLS. See id. at 59-60.
93.
Id. at 61.
94.
See id. at 69.
95.
See id. at 61.
96.
Id. at 62-63.
97.
Id. at 62.
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appellate court held that MLS was adequately constrained and did not
wield monopolistic power because players had alternative foreign
leagues in which to play. 98 As a result, even though the court did not
address the single entity status of MLS, the claim under section 2 of
the Sherman Act failed because the American league was unable to
assert a monopoly given the opportunities available to players in
foreign leagues.
As to the claimed violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
court explained that the Clayton Act prohibits stock or asset
acquisitions that substantially diminish competition or create a
monopoly in a given market. 9 9 MLS had established a brand new
market for Division I soccer players in the United States. 10 0
Therefore, the Clayton Act claim failed because it would be impossible
for MLS to reduce competition where none existed before. 10 1
The court went on to note that section 7 of the Clayton Act
could possibly be interpreted to prevent the elimination of potential
competition.10 2 However, the court found no evidence that investors
would have developed MLS like other traditionally structured leagues
10 3
if MLS had not been formed under its current organization.
Additionally, the plaintiffs did not produce evidence claiming that
structuring MLS as a typical league would have significantly
increased competition. 04 Consequently, this claim also failed.
3. Current MLS Regulations and the Transfer System
Now in its twelfth season, MLS has established a unique
system that grants the American league substantially more power
over its players relative to its European counterparts. The MLS
system of control is maintained through two mechanisms: extensive
power over player contracting and free implementation of transfer
fees. First, MLS regulations state that a "team retains the rights to
[a] player indefinitely following the expiration of a contract only if
attempts were made to re-sign the player."'' 0 However, MLS did not
elaborate on what constitutes a sufficient "attempt" to re-sign a

98.

See id. at 62-63.

99.

Id. at 69 (citing Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).

100.

Id. at 70.

101.
See id. at 70.
102.
See id. at 70-71.
103.
See id. at 71.
104.
See id.
105.
2007
MLS
REGULATIONS
§
III(C),
http://www.mlsnet.com/about/
league.jsp?section=regulations&content=overview (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
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player.106 Thus, a team can put forth minimal effort to re-sign a
player in order to maintain control over him.
Similarly, the
regulations also mandate that when a player's contract expires, the
team indefinitely retains the "right of first refusal" over his contract,
so long as attempts were made to re-sign the player. 10 7 Therefore,
under the MLS system, even when a player's contract expires, the
American league maintains almost absolute control over his ability to
10 8
contract with another team.
More significantly, MLS freely charges transfer fees when
contracting with international players and teams.1 0 9 Although the
ECJ publicly threatened to strike down in-contract transfer fees as a
violation of the Treaty of Rome, associations and clubs outside of the
European Union are not bound by ECJ decisions and can freely apply
transfer fees.'1 0 Because the Bosman decision only applies to interEuropean action and does not apply to transactions occurring between
European clubs and clubs outside of the European Union, MLS
remains free to charge transfer fees when dealing with the elite clubs
and national associations of Europe."'
C. FIFA's Reaction to Bosman
While the Bosman decision prohibited transfer fees only for
players who were out-of-contract, 1 2 the ECJ nevertheless began
questioning the validity of transfer fees for players under contract, as

106.
107.

See id.
Id. § V.

108.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-58. Thus, even though the team
maintains control over the player once his contract expires, it is really MLS itself
maintaining control over his ability to contract his services. See Fraser,284 F.3d at 53-54.
109.
See infra text accompanying notes 140-46. Although there is no specific mention
of transfer fees in the MLS regulations, the league's history reveals a strong reliance on
and utilization of transfer fees in international player contracting. For instance, in 2004,
premier Dutch club PSV Eindhoven sought to acquire American player DaMarcus Beasley
from his MLS club, the Chicago Fire. See Steven Goff, Convey's Transfer to Reading All Set;
United Gains Major Allocation Spot, WASH. POST, July 23, 2004, at D03. Exercising its
substantial control over its players, MLS refused to authorize Beasley's transfer overseas
until PSV agreed to pay a $2.5 million transfer fee to MLS on top of the amount already
being paid directly to the Chicago Fire. See id. More recently, MLS authorized a deal
transferring American international Clint Dempsey from his MLS club, the New England
Revolution, to English club Fullham FC for an MLS record-breaking $4 million transfer
fee. Frank Dell'Apa, Dempsey's $4 Million Transfer an MLS Record, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
3, 2007, at 5E.
110.
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 112.
111.
Id.
112.
See id. para. 114.
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113
well as questioning the international transfer system in general.
The issue was placed at the center of the soccer world in 1997, when
Brazilian striker Ronaldo, then considered the best player in the
world, was pursued by Inter Milan, an Italian club, while still under
contract with Barcelona, his Spanish club." 4 Inter Milan offered to
pay $26 million to buy out the rest of Ronaldo's contract, "[b]ut
Barcelona demanded an additional transfer fee to complete the
[move]. '"115 Before FIFA even entered the dispute, the ECJ sent a
letter to FIFA informing the organization that the implementation of
transfer fees in such a situation may stand as a violation of article 48
of the Treaty of Rome. 1 16 The ECJ eventually issued a series of
demands forcing FIFA to reexamine and reform the overall
17
international transfer system."
Four major parties drove the debate and reformation of the
European transfer system: the ECJ, FIFA, the European
Confederation, and the F~d~ration Internationale des Associations de
Footballeurs
Professionels
(FIFPro, the
worldwide
player's
association). 11 8 Ultimately, the following issues emerged as the major
concerns of the debate: the degree of control over player movement,
including the length of contract and transfer windows; the
establishment of a mechanism to ensure the survival of smaller clubs
without transfer fees; compensation for the training and development
of transferred players; the protection of minors; and the consequences
of unilateral breaches of contract. 1 9
On July 5, 2001, after more than two years of debate, meetings,
and turmoil, FIFA released a new set of policies and regulations to
govern the international transfer system. 20 In order to control player
movement and decrease club owners' uncertainty, FIFA mandated
that players under contract only be permitted to transfer during two
designated transfer periods, and only once in a single season.' 21 Also,
for a club to acquire a player from another national association, the

113.
See Irving, supra note 13, at 689.
114.
See id.; see also John Haydon, Brazil's Ronaldo on Track to Be World's Best
Player, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1997, at D6 (discussing Ronaldo's popularity).
115.
Irving, supra note 13.

116.

Id.

117.
See id.
118.
See id. at 711.
119.
See id. at 711-12.
120.
Id. at 714. Notably, FIFPro never accepted the regulations and threatened legal
action upon their enactment. See id. at 715.
121.
See FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS art. 6,
http://www.fifa.commm/document/affederation/administration/status-transfer-en-25.pdf
[hereinafter FIFA REGULATIONS].

2008]

TAKE THE TRAINING WHEELS OFFTHE LEAGUE

club must attain an International Transfer Certificate (ITC) from the
player's current association. 122 Abiding by the philosophy of Bosman,
however, FIFA indicated that an ITC would be completely "free of
charge [and] without conditions or time limitation."'123 Further, the
new FIFA regulations mandated that player contracts must be for a
time period between one season and five years. 24 However, FIFA
provided some leeway by stating that contracts of any other length
would be permitted, so long as they were consistent with the national
25
laws of the contracting parties.
FIFA's new regulations explicitly prohibited the unilateral
termination of contracts. 26 However, FIFA provided an exception to
this rule if a party breached a contract for "just cause" or "sporting
just cause."1 27 FIFA also established a comprehensive system of
sanctions in the event of an illegitimate breach of contract by any
party. 128 In addition, FIFA promulgated a regulation that players
under the age of eighteen could not have contracts longer than three
years. 29 The regulations also established that international transfers
of eighteen, unless a list
were only permitted for players over the 3age
0
of conditions supplied by FIFA were met.'
As for the protection of less-established clubs, the new FIFA
regulations ensured a system where lower-tiered clubs could continue
Essentially, the regulations
to exist despite player transfers.
established an intricate system requiring clubs to pay for the training
and development of acquired players.' 3 ' Essentially, once a player
begins his professional career, any club acquiring the player must pay

See id. art. 9.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. art. 18.
124.
Id.
125.
See id. art. 13.
126.
See id. arts. 13-15. FIFA provided a set of designated actions and circumstances
127.
that would constitute just cause for a party to unilaterally breach a contract. See id.
See id. art. 17. The rules mandate that both clubs and players may be
128.
susceptible to financial sanctions, as well as sporting sanctions entailing from national and
international soccer competition. See id.
Id. art. 18.
129.
See id. art. 19. A player is exempt from the age requirement if "[tihe player's
130.
parents move to the country in which the New Club is located for reasons not linked to
[soccer]." Id. art. 19(2)(a). A player is also exempt if "[t]he player lives no further than
50km from [the] national border" of the new club, the new club is also within 50km of the
national border, and "the maximum distance between the player's domicile and the club's
quarters [is] 100km." Id. art. 19(2)(c). "In such cases, the player must continue to live at
home and the two Associations concerned must give their explicit consent." Id.
See id. art. 20; see also id. annex 4 (detailing when a club is responsible for
131.
training costs and how much it must pay).
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the player's former club for his training and development. 132 Due to
concerns of the European Confederation of ensuring the continued
survival of smaller clubs, FIFA also included a solidarity mechanism
in the new rules and regulations, which provides: "If a Professional is
transferred before the expiry of his contract, any club that has
contributed to his education and training shall receive a proportion of
the
compensation
paid to
his
previous
club
(solidarity
133
contribution)."
Thus, while an acquiring team must provide
payment to a player's immediately preceding club, the solidarity
mechanism ensures that each of the player's previous clubs that
participated in his training and development also receive
compensation from the transfer. However, the solidarity mechanism
is limited in that an acquired player's previous clubs will stop
receiving portions of transfer deals after the player turns twenty-three
years old.1 34 Finally, the FIFA regulations also set up a system to deal
35
with disputes and challenges.'
II. ANALYSIS: How MLS FITS INTO THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER
SYSTEM

Ultimately, when examining the different transfer and player
regulations and their underlying purposes, an inherent tension
emerges between ensuring players' rights and compliance with
European anti-competition law, on the one hand, and granting power
to clubs and national associations to survive and succeed on the
international stage, on the other hand.
A. MLS's Conflict with the InternationalSoccer Community
Given the tight controls MLS maintains over its players, the
American league stands in direct conflict with the majority of the
international soccer community.
Specifically, MLS regulations
concerning player contracting and transfer fees significantly diverge
from the policies and principles of FIFA and the European system.

132.
See id. annex 4, art. 2 (mandating that training compensation is required until
the end of the season of the player's twenty-third birthday).
133.
Id. art. 21 (emphasis added); see also id. annex 5 (detailing how solidarity
contributions are calculated).
134.
See id. annex 5, art. 1.
135.
See id. arts. 22-24 (establishing a Players' Status Committee and a Dispute
Resolution Chamber to adjudicate employment-related disputes).
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1. MLS's Direct Conflicts with the European Transfer System
MLS's regulations are diametrically opposed to the laws and
principles now governing the European soccer transfer market, as
expressed in the Bosman decision. 136 As explained, Bosman outlawed
the application of transfer fees in Europe to players who were out-ofcontract. 137 According to the Bosman court, the imposition of transfer
fees constituted an illegal restraint on a player's freedom to move and
seek employment throughout the European Union, in violation of
article 48 of the Treaty of Rome. 138 After Bosman, the European
soccer community reformed its rules to facilitate a freer, lessrestrictive system where players could assert their rights as
139
employees and assume more control over their careers.
Unlike the European system, MLS maintains a tight hold on
players' rights through the imposition of transfer fees. 140 By charging
exorbitant fees for potential transfers, MLS can effectively control a
player's exit from the American league.
Whenever a player is
considering leaving or is being pursued by a foreign club, MLS
possesses the power to apply huge transfer fees, chilling the likelihood
of any such transfer being completed. Consequently, MLS policy and
procedures demonstrate a lower regard for player autonomy and
directly contradict the structure and principles of the current
European system.
2. Implicit Tension Between MLS and FIFA Regulations
As explained, current FIFA regulations do not expressly
prohibit the use of transfer fees. 4 1
Also, there are no specific
provisions concerning a league's retention of player rights after
contract expiration or a league's right of refusal over a player's
contract. 42 As a result, MLS regulations do not explicitly violate any
FIFA regulations concerning player transfers. Nevertheless, FIFA
regulations do reflect a greater respect of player freedom and

136.
Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Boseman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921; see supra Part I.A.2.
137.
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 114; supra Part I.A.2.
138.
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, paras. 99-100, 104; supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
139.
See Irving, supra note 13, at 714-15.
140.
See infra text accompanying notes 141-49.
141.
See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 121, art. 6. This is probably due to the fact
that it was initially the ECJ that warned and demanded FIFA to reform the overall
international transfer system; see supra text accompanying note 117.
142.
See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 121.
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autonomy. Consequently, the MLS regulations implicitly conflict with
the underlying purposes and principles of the current FIFA system.
For instance, FIFA established the default rule that a player's
contract can cover a minimum of one season and a maximum of five
years. 143 Under the MLS system, the league can maintain indefinite
control over a player's rights, even after contract expiration, providing
the league attempts to re-sign him. 144 While FIFA's default rules
establish limits for contract length and fix time periods of league and
club control over a player,' 45 MLS retains control over a player's
46
rights, regardless of the length of the contract or its expiration.
Thus, although there is no direct conflict between MLS and FIFA
regulations as far as contract length is concerned, the underlying
principles regarding player control are at odds.
Another source of tension exists because of MLS's lack of a
system of sanctions in the event of unilateral and illegitimate
breaches of player contracts. 47 FIFA regulations, on the other hand,
directly prohibit the unilateral breach of any player contract either by
the club or the player.' 48 Under FIFA rules, contracts may only be
49
terminated though mutual agreement or contract expiration.'
Furthermore, FIFA has implemented a comprehensive system of
sanctioning, including financial, legal, and sporting sanctions in the
event of an illegitimate breach by any party. 150 While MLS does not
maintain regulations expressly conflicting with the above FIFA
policies, the American league's ability to maintain indefinite control
over players allows it to avoid the underlying purposes of the FIFA
sanction system.
FIFA regulations concerning player contracts guarantee a
mutual commitment by the club and player to the rights and
responsibilities established by the agreement. Players are expected to
honor the duration of contracts and may face serious sanctions if they
unilaterally breach the contract for personal benefit.' 5 ' At the same
time, clubs must honor their commitments to employ a player for a

143.

Id. art. 18.

See MLS REGULATIONS, supra note 105, § III(C).
144.
See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 121, art. 18.
145.
146.
See MLS REGULATIONS, supra note 105, § 111(C).
See id.
147.
FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 121, art. 16.
148.
149.
Id. art. 13.
See id. art. 17.
150.
See id. arts. 13, 17 (providing that a player may not only be financially liable,
151.
but also may be suspended from competition).
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specified time period 15 2 and must also, upon contract expiration, allow
a player the freedom to begin searching for a new contract with
153
whatever club he may choose.
MLS follows a different approach, however, and allows the
American league to maintain indefinite control over a player, even
after his contract expires. 154 This omnipotence significantly interferes
with a player's rights to effectively search for, negotiate, and attain
his preferred employment. Due to MLS's control over players' rights,
the American league possesses the ability to manipulate and direct its
players without breaching any contractual obligations. As a result,
MLS effectively sidesteps the regulations designed to protect players
without explicitly violating any of FIFA's contract rules. Again, the
underlying conflict between the MLS and FIFA systems stems from
the degree of control each organization possesses over its players.
With the free use of transfer fees, MLS's actions further conflict
with FIFA's principles concerning international transfers. FIFA does
not expressly prohibit transfer fees in its regulations.1 55 However,
FIFA does address the issue with its treatment of ITCs.' 56 FIFA
regulations mandate that, in order for a player to be transferred from
a club of one national association to a club of another national
association, the player's current club must register an ITC with the
prospective club's national association.1 57 Under FIFA regulations,
ITCs are "issued free of charge without any conditions or time
limitation[s],"' 158 revealing an intention on the part of FIFA to conduct
international transfers free of any supplementary charges, such as
transfer fees. Directly contradicting this approach, MLS implements
transfer fees in connection with international transfers. 159 While MLS
may not directly charge for issuing a transferring player's ITC, the
American league often prohibits transfers or maximizes profits
1 60
through the attachment of transfer fees to international deals.
Therefore, although MLS does not directly violate any of the FIFA
regulations governing player transfers, its practices once again
conflict with the underlying principles of the FIFA system.

152.
153.

See id.
See id. art. 18, §3.

154.

See MLS REGULATIONS, supra note 105, § III(C).

155.
156.
157.
158.

See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 121.
See id. art. 9.
See id.
Id.

159.
160.

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109.
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B. Justificationsfor the MLS Approach

One of MLS's goals is to establish itself as a premier national
soccer league. League decisions are designed to achieve this objective
and also to avoid the perception that MLS is merely a feeder league
for the European giants. 161 Consequently, league officials are
reluctant to export MLS's top talent because it would most likely
diminish the level of play, fan base, and overall success of the
American league, both in the United States and abroad. 162 Therefore,
in order to continue league development, MLS utilizes its means of
control to keep its elite players in the United States. 163 New England
Revolution Coach Steve Nicol stated:
No longer are we or anybody else in the USA feeding grounds for everyone else.
We are trying to build a league here and we certainly aren't going to do that by
giving a good player away every time we get one ....
As far as the league is
164
concerned, they are trying to build a league.

Overall, MLS exercises substantial power over player contracting and
rejects transfer deals in order to establish itself as an elite league in
the international soccer world.
C. Disadvantagesof the MLS System

In comparing MLS to FIFA, it becomes evident that the
conflicts between these major institutions of international soccer pose
a host of serious problems. From the general divergence with the
policies and principles of the international system to the direct effects
that MLS's regulations have on its own players, MLS's current
organization produces a multitude of problems affecting the validity
and growth of the premier American soccer league.
1. Alienation from the International Soccer Community
With its current structure and transfer policies, MLS
effectively alienates itself from the majority of the international soccer
community. MLS's policies directly conflict with European anticompetition law with its implementation of transfer fees.165

161.
See Andrew Hush, The MLS Transfer System: To Damage or Develop?, SOCCER
NEW ENG., Sept. 2, 2006, http://www.soccernewengland.com/articles/view-article.php?id
=1601.

162.
163.
164.
165.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
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Furthermore, MLS's ability to control indefinitely players' rights after
contract expiration would most likely violate article 48 of the Treaty of
Rome as an illegal hindrance on a player's right to freely move and
seek employment. 66 The American league's direct conflict with the
European system proves especially significant because the European
Confederation is home to the richest and most influential clubs of the
167
international community, as well as the top players of the world.
Consequently, when MLS demands transfer fees from European clubs
that are attempting to do business with the American league, it
alienates itself by demanding what is seen as an illegal payment in
168
the eyes of the elite European soccer community.
MLS's ability to retain indefinite control of and right of first
refusal over player contracts further alienates the American league
from Europe, due to the disproportionate amount of power the
American league wields over its players. In the wake of Bosman, the
European transfer system has been reformed, granting players much
more freedom and autonomy in directing their own professional
careers.1 69 MLS, however, still retains a substantial level of control
over player rights. As a result, whenever MLS deals with the elite
soccer associations of the world, there remains a certain degree of
estrangement, as MLS heavily utilizes practices that are both illegal
and disrespected in the European soccer community.
MLS is further alienated from the world soccer community due
to its indirect conflict with FIFA's transfer regulations. Although
MLS regulations do not expressly conflict with any of FIFA's transfer
regulations, its practices significantly diverge from the principles
underlying the FIFA approach.1 70 Consequently, whenever the two
organizations interact, FIFA must deal with a league that is
effectively rejecting its approach. Thus, MLS further estranges itself
from the international community by utilizing practices and
procedures that conflict with the principles followed by the rest of the
soccer world.
166.
See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, paras. 87-100 (discussing article 48 in the context of the
European soccer community); see also EC Treaty, supra note 39, art. 48 (providing for the
freedom of movement for workers within the member states).
167.
See Mike Collett, ANALYSIS-Soccer-Time for UEFA to Decide to Stick or Twist,
REUTERS UK, Jan. 19, 2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL1884574020070119.
168.
This was the exact situation in the many failed deals predating the eventual
transfer of American international Clint Dempsey. See infra text accompanying notes 17679 (discussing Dempsey's trouble with MLS after it refused to execute his transfer).
169.
See Irving, supra note 13, at 688-717; see also FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note
121.
170.
See supra Part II.A.2.
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2. Hindrance of American Soccer Players' Careers

The MLS system has potentially devastating effects on its
players and their development. Consider, for example, when an MLS
player receives attention and offers from more established,
competitive, and wealthy clubs from abroad. In such cases, if MLS
decides that a player's value to either his club or the league outweighs
the potential benefits of his transfer (i.e., by imposing transfer fees),
the American league can employ its control mechanisms to block the
transfer completely. Meanwhile, in the event that the player wants to
be transferred, MLS's unilateral imposition on his career direction can
have devastating effects on the player and eventually the American
league itself.
Such was the situation for American player and rising star
Clint Mathis. In 2002, German championship team Bayern Munich
sought to acquire Mathis from his MLS club, the MetroStars. 171 Much
to Mathis's dismay, MLS refused to execute the transfer, claiming that
Bayern Munich's transfer fee offers were "embarrassingly low." 172 The
lost opportunity had a significant effect on Mathis's play. Mathis
ended the season by intentionally stomping on a player, thus receiving
a red card, and having his MLS coach suggest that he "needed
psychiatric help."' 73
Demonstrating his disappointment and
resentment towards MLS, Mathis left the American league when his
contract expired a year later and joined a German club, Hannover
96.174 As a result of this independent, out-of-contract transfer, MLS
received no compensation for the transfer. 175
Another example of the devastating effect of MLS policies may
be seen in the case of American superstar Clint Dempsey who, after a
standout performance in the 2006 World Cup, received attention and
offers from numerous English Premier League clubs. 76 When MLS
refused to execute a transfer of Dempsey to England, Dempsey went
from "World Cup standout to MLS bad boy," receiving two suspensions
for disorderly conduct during games. 77
Once again, MLS's
domination over its players' careers had a devastating effect, not only

171.
See Ives Galarcep, Beasley Mulls a Move Home, ESPNSOCCERNET, Aug. 25,
2006, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id=377088&root=mls&cc=5901.

172.
173.

Id.
Id.

174.
175.
176.
177.

See id.
See id.
Dell'Apa, supra note 2.
Galarcep, supra note 171.
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on the player's development, but also on the player's MLS team and
MLS itself.
When players are refused the opportunity to advance to greater
competition,
greater
recognition,
and
significantly
greater
compensation, their worth to MLS, in terms of performance, may
drastically decline. As seen in the examples of Mathis and Dempsey, a
player's quality of play may decrease dramatically, along with his
loyalty and commitment to his team. 178 At the same time, a player
may manifest his frustration through violent acts during play or other
disorderly conduct directed towards the league itself. 179 Ironically,
when MLS decides to retain a player and block his transfer offers, the
player may essentially become worthless to the American league.
Moreover, once a player like Dempsey and Mathis loses value
in terms of his actual playing performance, MLS loses the potential for
significant compensation from the player's transfer. Referring back to
the Mathis example, once Mathis's quality of play and commitment to
the American league drastically decreased, MLS no longer had a
strong incentive to retain him.18 0 Unfortunately for MLS, however,
due to the significant drop in Mathis's performance, the value of his
offers and other clubs' willingness to pay the requisite transfer fees
substantially dropped as well. Essentially, MLS's decision to block the
Mathis transfer led to both a stall in the player's development and
career, as well as his eventual transfer with virtually no compensation
to MLS.1 81 The American league's current arrangement allows for the
hindrance of American players' careers and is one of the more
significant drawbacks of the MLS system.
Aside from the destructive effects that transfer denials can
inflict upon a player's career, critics argue that America's best talent
must go overseas to train with the world's elite teams and players in
order to develop fully and to mature.18 2 Such was the argument when
American player DaMarcus Beasley was considering a return to MLS

178.
See id. (noting that Mathis left for Germany as soon as his contract expired and
that Dempsey has "stated publicly that he is desperate to go to Europe").
179.
See id.
180. See id. (asserting that behavioral problems and suspensions are not "exactly
ideal for a player [MLS is] trying to market and sell for a sizeable transfer fee").
181.
See supra notes 171.75 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Michael Lewis, MLS Must Be a Springboard, CNN/SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED ,Sept. 22, 2000, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/insidegame/michaellewis!
news/2000/09/22flewis insider ('"MLS . . .eventually will have to come to the realization
that it will lose many of its best players to European clubs, for the sake of American soccer
and the national team."); see also Galarcep, supra note 171 (maintaining that an American
player "can make his biggest mark" in Europe).
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83
after two years abroad with PSV Eindhoven, an elite Dutch team.
Critics argued that a move back to MLS would curtail twenty-fouryear-old Beasley's development because the American league could not
provide the same level of competition and experience Beasley was
receiving in Europe.18 4 Commenting on Beasley's situation, soccer
analyst Ives Galarcep stated, "As much as it would be nice for fans to
be able to watch him run circles around his MLS counterparts,
[Beasley's place] is in Europe-where the world's best offer the game's
best challenge." 18 5 For American players to reach their greatest
potential, they must have the opportunity to play in Europe in order to
18 6
receive the highest levels of training and competition.

3. Disadvantaging MLS and American Soccer Overall
Sports critics argue that preventing Americans from playing in
more competitive leagues hinders the advancement of American soccer
overall.18 7
Because MLS cannot offer America's top talent the
competition, training, and development available to them from the
world's top clubs and leagues, 8 8 players do not reach their full
potential in MLS. As a result, American soccer suffers as a whole, as
manifested through the poor performance of the American national
team. 189

Essentially, the image, respect, and success of American soccer
rests upon the achievements and failures of the American national
team, which serves as the nation's chief representative on the
international stage and at international competitions like the World
Cup, the Confederations Cup, and the Olympics. 90 Success at such
competitions will arguably raise interest and promote the chief goal of
American soccer: to secure a place as one of the world's elite soccer
leagues. 191 From increased financial support, such as corporate

183.
184.

Galarcep, supra note 171.
See id.

185.
186.

Id.
Id.

187.
See Lewis, supra note 182; supra Part II.C.2 (discussing DaMarcus Beasley's
situation).
188.
See Lewis, supra note 182.
189.
See id. (noting that the 1992 Olympic team only included two professional
players and did not even make it to the quarterfinals).
190.
See id. Lewis emphasizes the importance of "success in the World Cup, whether
it is reaching soccer's promised land on a consistent basis or excelling in the tournament,
where a country's rewards-monetary and otherwise-are greater, and reputation is on the
line." Id.
191.
See id.
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endorsements and partnerships, to increased interest among
American fans, the success of the American national team is one of the
192
key ingredients to the success of MLS and American soccer overall.
The success of the American national team will not only
promote American soccer domestically, but also within the
international community. Such positive attention could lead to more
international players playing for MLS teams, more inter-league
competition, and financial endorsements from foreign sponsors.
However, to achieve this success MLS must allow its players to
maximize their potential abroad. By blocking talent from playing and
developing overseas, MLS is obstructing its own advancement, as well
as that of American soccer overall.
III. SOLUTION: MLS MUST LOOSEN THE REINS OF PLAYER CONTROL

MLS faces a difficult quandary, given that there are legitimate
arguments on both sides of this debate. After ten years of operation,
MLS is convinced it can establish itself as a premier national
association, but continues to struggle in retaining top talent. The
American league's coaches, players, and critics agree that MLS
currently does not possess the means to compete effectively with the
European giants. 193 Additionally, league policies regarding control
over player transfers effectively hinder the success of MLS and its
players.194
If MLS is to establish itself as an elite national association, its
current transfer policies must change. Although league officials
present a legitimate justification for retaining MLS's top talent,
forcing players to remain in the American league is not feasible and is
counterproductive in practice, as evidenced by the examples of both
Mathis and Dempsey. 195
Players who are frustrated with the
American league's control over their careers may become worthless to
MLS. Not only do these players' level of play, will, and motivation
suffer, but MLS's ability to capitalize on their talent drastically
diminishes as well, since these players eventually leave the American
league after their contracts expire, resulting in little or no transfer
fee. 196

192.

Id.

193.
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See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.C.2.

196.

See Galarcep, supra note 171.
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MLS should be willing to export its best players in order to
maximize the development of America's top talent for the good of the
American national team, MLS, and American soccer in general. While
MLS may wish to keep its talent in the United States, the realities of
international soccer require that these players have the freedom to go
abroad in order to develop their talents. MLS must recognize these
circumstances and realize that forcing players to stay in the American
league yields the worst results in the long run for all parties involved.
A. MLS Should Offer Players ContractualIncentives
MLS must relinquish the overwhelming degree of control it
maintains over its players. By following FIFA regulations, MLS could
still possess a certain degree of power to protect itself, its teams, and
its players. 197 Instead of the current system of transfer fees and
indefinite control over players' rights, MLS should offer incentives to
entice players to compete domestically. Although MLS does not have
the financial means to compete with European teams, the American
league could offer attractive contract provisions, such as guarantees of
playing time, in order to secure desirable players. Considering the
fierce competition to play in Europe, American players may be
dissuaded to leave MLS if the American league could surpass
European clubs in terms of contractual benefits.
B. MLS Should Recognize Player Circumstances
MLS must recognize that, given the varying situations of each
player, dropping league controls would not necessarily lead to a mass
exodus of American talent.
For instance, after celebrating his
marriage, player Chris Armas signed a long-term deal with MLS's
Chicago Fire expressing his desire to remain in the United States, at
least for the time being.198 This example proves that playing overseas
is not the goal of every American standout and that some players wish
to stay with the American league, even if given the opportunity to play
abroad. MLS should be aware of, and take advantage of, player
circumstances when drafting its contracts. Also, MLS should be more
confident that players will choose to stay in the American league and
trust that loosening controls on player transfers would not necessarily
lead to the mass flight that it fears so much.

197.
See generally FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 121 (providing rules governing
contracts between players and clubs).
198.
See Lewis, supra note 182.
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C. MLS Should Capitalize on its Significant Signing Power
Even if MLS is not able to retain top American talent, the
American league is capable of importing elite international talent to
help develop its teams. Due to the American league's stability and its
location in the United States, MLS has been able draw top talent from
around the world. For instance, MLS club D.C. United recently
acquired Brazilian standout Luciano Emilio and is considering
acquiring other top players from South America.' 99 MLS club Real
Salt Lake acquired World Cup superstar Luis Tejada from his
Panamanian team. 20 0 Other MLS signings have included German
legend Lothar Matthaus, Columbian World Cup star Carlos
Valderrama, Italian legend Roberto Donadoni, and French World Cup
winner Youri Djorkaeff. 20 1 These players captivated American soccer
fans, not to mention the rest of the soccer world, leading to greater
revenues in advertising and ticket sales. 20 2 The presence of such
international soccer superstars has also increased the level of talent
and play in the United States, adding new dimensions to the
American league.
MLS appears to be gaining power in its ability to attract
international superstars and first-class talent to the American league.
Sending shockwaves through the international community and the
United States, MLS recently announced the acquisition of
international soccer superstar David Beckham to the Los Angeles
Galaxy, an MLS club. 20 3 At thirty-one years old, experts agree that
Beckham is still in his soccer prime, and he is still regarded as one of
the world's most talented players. 20 4 As evidenced by Beckham's
signing, MLS's increase in signing power is attracting the attention of
soccer fans, both in the United States and abroad. For instance,
within a week of Beckham's signing, the Los Angeles Galaxy reported
20 5
selling 5,000 season tickets, a considerable increase from years past.
Beckham's addition to the Galaxy also attracted 1,500 applications to
199.
Steven Goff, BrazilianForwardEmilio is Ready to Sign with D.C., WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 2007, at E03.
200.
James Edward, RSL Adds Another Acquisition in Tejada, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 14, 2006, at D05.
201.
Marc Connolly, Connolly: Beckham, MLS a Good Fit, MLSNET.COM, Jan. 11,
2007, http://web.mlsnet.com/news/mls-news.jsp?ymd=200701 1 &content-id=81616&vkey=
newsmls&fext=.jsp.
202.
See id.
203.
Id.
204.
See id.
205.
See Lacy J. Banks, Fire Saves Becks for Last: English Star Will Come to Town
for Final Game of Regular Season, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 7, 2007, at 105.
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participate in open tryouts for the team, drawing both international
and domestic players for the chance to play alongside the soccer
icon.

20 6

MLS's attraction only appears to be growing stronger, as
rumors have surfaced that Edgar Davids, a Dutch star, and Ronaldo,
Brazil's World Cup winner and two-time World Player of the Year, are
considering transferring to MLS teams. 20 7 These players are close to
the peak of their careers and represent a great potential to advance
the level of play, competition, and experience in the American league.
Through these signings and others, the American league will be able
to advance its development and thrust MLS into the mainstream of
American culture.
The attraction of foreign players to MLS helps counterbalance
the fact that some American players, if allowed to control their own
careers, would choose to transfer to international teams. However,
the presence of these players on MLS teams would also make the level
of play and experience in the American league that much stronger.
Arguably, players would be able to receive the same high level of play
and training while playing for MLS, all without leaving the United
States.
IV. CONCLUSION

MLS has declared its intention to establish itself as a premier
soccer association. The First Circuit, in Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, L.L.C., effectively granted MLS an exemption from American
antitrust law, thus protecting the American system of player
control. 20 8
Unfortunately for MLS, Europe, the center of the
international soccer community, has outlawed the system currently
followed by the American league. 20 9 Even worse, FIFA has reformed
its transfer regulations to promote players' rights. 210
These
differences between the MLS transfer policy and both European and
FIFA regulations mark the chief obstacle in MLS's establishment as
an elite league in the international soccer community.
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Major League Soccer, in only its twelfth season, is still fighting
to establish its prominence and reputation as a legitimate national
soccer association. Competing with the elite European powerhouses,
not to mention other national associations of countries around the
world, MLS asserts its need to maintain tight control over its players
as its way to protect and develop the American league. 211 However, its
tight controls over players' rights undermine the full development and
potential of American players. 212 Despite MLS's desire to keep its
superstars at home, the American league cannot offer the training,
competition, and opportunities that are available in Europe, which
would allow American stars to reach their full potential. 213 Because
player development directs the establishment and advancement of
MLS and American soccer overall, and the American national team is
a major factor in promoting American soccer both home and abroad,
MLS must relinquish control and allow players to transfer teams if
they so desire. Even if MLS does relinquish this control, it still
possesses the power to advance and develop further the American
league with its increasing signing power and international allure. At
the end of the day, two conclusions are clear. First, the exercise of
strict player control wounds both MLS and the players in the long run;
therefore, mechanisms should be loosened. Second, if MLS does
indeed relax its transfer policies, it has the potential to continue
developing through the attraction of international talent.
MLS may be likened to a child learning to ride a bike for the
first time. In its first few seasons, MLS needed training wheels in
order to protect and to survive in the international soccer community.
However, in light of the American league's successes and increasing
power, MLS has demonstrated its ability to endure and advance
without these safeguards. As a result, it is time for the American
league to remove its training wheels and strive to reach the next level,
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See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.

444 VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:2:413
as other international leagues have done. By relinquishing player
control and allowing more player autonomy, MLS can reach its
ultimate goal of becoming one of the world's elite soccer leagues.
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